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Do Children of Immigrants 
Make Differential Use of 
Public Health Insurance? 
Janet Currie 
The fraction of the U.S. population that is foreign born has risen dramati- 
cally over the past two decades from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 7.9 percent in 
1990 (Banister 1994). First- and second-generation children of immigrants 
are the fastest-growing segment of the U.S. population under age  15; by 
2010, it is estimated that 20 percent of school-aged children will be chil- 
dren of recent immigrants (Lamberg 1996). By  1997, l in every 6 children 
(12 million) were immigrants or had immigrant parents (Hernandez and 
Charney 1998). 
The increased inflow of immigrants has been accompanied by growing 
concern about the cost of social services used by  immigrants and their 
families. Many previous studies have shown that because immigrants tend 
to be poorer than the native born, their  children are more likely to be 
eligible for welfare programs (Blau 1984; Borjas 1990; Borjas and Hilton 
1996; Jensen 1988; Tienda and Jensen 1986; Trejo 1992). Concern about 
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the fiscal burden imposed by immigrants provided the impetus for certain 
provisions of the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor- 
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). This bill will sharply cur- 
tail the availability of welfare benefits for immigrants. It is estimated that 
of the projected $56 billion in federal funds the law will save over the next 
six years, almost half will  come from a reduction of payments to immi- 
grants (Fix and Zimmerman 1997). 
Medicaid, a system of public health insurance for poor women and chil- 
dren, is one of the more costly social programs available to the families of 
immigrants. In recent years, the United  States spent about $3.4 billion 
annually on cash welfare payments to children under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (Clark 1994), and $5.5 billion 
on payments to children of immigrants under the Medicaid program.' The 
new law will ban legal immigrants from Medicaid for five years after their 
arrival in the United States, after which time states will have the authority 
to decide whether or not they will be eligible. Undocumented immigrants 
have never been eligible for coverage of routine care under the Medicaid 
program. All immigrants will continue to be eligible for coverage of emer- 
gency medical care and for public health assistance (immunizations and 
treatment of communicable diseases). Refugees and citizen children of im- 
migrants will also remain eligible for Medicaid coverage. 
Although the law is likely to reduce Medicaid coverage, it is difficult to 
predict the effect it will have on either health care costs or public health 
because these more important outcomes are determined by utilization of 
care rather than by insurance coverage per se. Medicaid differs in a funda- 
mental way from other welfare programs, because it is possible for uncov- 
ered individuals to receive emergency services that are paid  for by  the 
program ex post (while it is not possible for example, for someone ineli- 
gible for cash assistance to legally receive cash benefits). The evidence pre- 
sented in this paper is consistent with the previous evidence that because 
of their characteristics, immigrants are more likely than nonimmigrants to 
be eligible for Medicaid. However, it suggests that making children ineli- 
gible for Medicaid coverage will reduce the use of relatively low-cost routine 
preventive care, without having much impact on the utilization of more 
costly services. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Necessary background infor- 
mation about the Medicaid program and a discussion of its effects on the 
incentives facing eligible immigrants and nonimmigrants is given in sec- 
tion 7.1. Section 7.2  outlines the instrumental variables strategy. The data 
1.  By way  of  comparison,  the entire budget for AFDC was approximately $22 billion 
annually. AFDC has recently been replaced with the Temporary Aid for Needy Families 
(TANF) program. According to Clark (1 994), Medicaid expenditures for immigrants total 
$16.6 billion. Since two-thirds of Medicaid expenditures are on the elderly, this implies that 
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are described in section 7.3. Section 7.4 provides the empirical results, 
while section 7.5 concludes. 
7.1  The Medicaid Expansions and Incentives 
for Immigrants and Nonimmigrants 
Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was closely tied to the receipt of 
cash welfare payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil- 
dren program. Hence, eligibility was effectively limited to very low income 
women and children in single parent families. Beginning in  1984, states 
were first permitted  and then required to extend Medicaid coverage to 
other groups of children. By 1992, states were required to cover children be- 
low age 6 in families with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal pov- 
erty line, and children between ages 6 and 19 with family incomes up to 100 
percent of the poverty line; states also had the option of covering infants 
up to  185 percent of the poverty line.* A  list of the relevant statutes is 
given in appendix B. 
The important point  to note is that  states took up these options at 
different rates, so that there was a great deal of variation across states in 
both the income thresholds and the age limits governing Medicaid eligibil- 
ity. Table 7C. 1 in appendix C shows the maximum age covered by Medic- 
aid in each state at three different points in time, as well as the maximum 
income limit that applied to any child made eligible by the expansions (the 
oldest child eligible was generally subject to a less-generous income cut- 
off). Older children remained eligible if their families received AFDC. The 
table shows that  as of January  1988, 26  states had taken  advantage of 
the options described above to extend Medicaid eligibility to previously 
ineligible children. By December 1989, all 50 states had expanded Medic- 
aid eligibility-however,  states like Colorado covered only infants in fami- 
lies with incomes up to 75 percent of the poverty line, while more generous 
states, like California, covered children up to age 5 in families with in- 
comes up to 100 percent of the poverty line, and covered infants in families 
with incomes up to 185 percent of the poverty line. 
By December  1991, most states had been required by the federal gov- 
ernment to increase the age limits and income limits still further. Table 7.1 
illustrates the growing uniformity in the way that children were treated in 
three states that began the period with widely differing eligibility criteria: 
California, Texas, and New Jersey. This variation in eligibility thresholds 
by state, year, and age of child will be exploited to identify the effects of 
Medicaid eligibility. 
2. States received federal matching funds for coverage of these groups. However, some 
states have extended coverage to children above 200 percent of the poverty line, using only 
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Table 7.1  Eligibility for Medicaid by  Age and Percentage of Federal Poverty Line: 
California, Texas, and New Jersey 
January 1988  December 1989  December  199  I 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
of Federal  of Federal  of Federal 




75a  <1 
1-5 
6+ 
22"  <1 
1-3 
4+ 
50'  <2 
3+ 
185  <1 
133  1-5 
75  6-8 
9+ 
130  <1 
100  1-5 
22  6-8 
9+ 
100  <I 















Note: Children born after 30 September 1983 were eligible for Medicaid if their families were income 
eligible for AFDC. Older children were eligible only if their parents actually qualified for AFDC (i.e., 
met all other requirements as well as income eligibility). By 1989, states were required to cover children 
through age six if their families were income eligible for AFDC. 
aThe 75 percent, 22 percent, and SO percent figures are based on the maximum AFDC benefit levels 
for these states. 
A large literature documents the fact that eligible individuals do not 
always take up public assistance--for  example, only about two-thirds of 
those  eligible  for  AFDC or unemployment  insurance  receive benefits 
(Blank and Card 1991; Blank and Ruggles 1993). The probability of tak- 
ing up benefits should be systematically related to the relative costs and 
benefits of being covered. For example, as Blank and Card suggest, those 
who expect to be unemployed for only a short spell may be less likely to 
apply for or receive benefits. The available preexpansion evidence suggests 
that  although take-up of Medicaid  among children  on AFDC is  high, 
only about one-quarter of children eligible through other aspects of the 
program  (e.g., under the Ribicoff provisions) took up coverage (Shore- 
Sheppard 1996). 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that immigrant parents face higher 
costs of enrolling their children in the Medicaid program than nonimmi- 
grants. First, the General Accounting Office (US.  GAO 1994) reports that 
many applications are denied and that half of all denials occur because 
the applicant failed to supply supporting documentation (such as birth 
certificates or pay stubs) or failed to keep all of the necessary appoint- 
ments. It may be more difficult for immigrants to follow these procedures. 
Second, although citizen children are eligible for all Medicaid services, Children of Immigrants and Public Health Insurance  275 
and even undocumented children are eligible for emergency services under 
the Medicaid  program, immigrant parents may fear harassment by  au- 
thorities, particularly if they or other family members are themselves un- 
documented. Third, the residential segregation of many immigrants may 
make it difficult to get to an enrollment center. Fourth, language barriers 
may make the enrollment process more difficult. 
It is also possible that the benefits of formal enrollment are not as great 
as they might at first appear, because it is often possible for eligible chil- 
dren to obtain acute services even if they are not formally covered at the 
time that  services are rendered. The GAO gives the following example: 
“The child of a single, uninsured, working mother incurred a $20,000 hos- 
pital bill. . . . The hospital referred this case to an enrollment vendor firm 
after determining that it was a potential Medicaid case. After contacting 
the mother, the firm initiated and submitted a Medicaid application. The 
firm gave the applicant a list of verification items she would have to pro- 
vide. However, the applicant did not provide the requested items and Med- 
icaid coverage was denied. Upon learning of the denial, the firm contacted 
the applicant twice weekly for a period of two months to get her to cooper- 
ate, . . . Eventually, the applicant responded and submitted the verification 
items and a signed power of attorney to the firm. . . . The signed power of 
attorney allowed the firm to appeal the denial successfully” (U.S. GAO, 
24). In this example, the child became covered by  Medicaid for a time. 
But eligibility must be periodically reestablished in order to retain cover- 
age, and one suspects that this child’s coverage might have been particu- 
larly likely to lapse subsequently. 
Hence, immigrant parents with an eligible child have two options: They 
can choose to incur the transactions costs and become covered. The Med- 
icaid program will then cover the costs of both preventive care and acute 
care for their child. Alternatively, they may choose to forgo the transac- 
tions costs and remain uncovered, knowing that acute care will be pro- 
vided under  the Medicaid  program  as necessary. Viewed  in a dynamic 
context, parents who face higher transactions costs may simply choose to 
enroll their children less often than other parents. For example, instead of 
keeping children continuously enrolled, which requires going through an 
administrative procedure at least every six months, they might choose to 
enroll their children only when they needed to take them to the doctor for 
some form of routine care. 
The role of transactions costs is  depicted in  figure 7.1, which  shows 
the trade-off between expenditures on health insurance for children and 
expenditures on other child goods. An eligible child whose family faces no 
transactions costs becomes covered by the program and is able to consume 
at point M1. A family facing high transactions costs can choose to become 
enrolled and consume at point M4, or it can choose to forgo coverage and 
consume slightly less health insurance at point M2. Thus, if parents have 276  Janet Currie 
Health Insurance 
Transaction Costs 
Fig. 7.1  The role of transactions costs 
preferences like those depicted in the figure and immigrant parents face 
higher transactions costs than nonimmigrant parents, then their eligible 
children will be less likely to become formally covered. 
Parents of eligible children may also have another decision to make: 
whether or not to take up Medicaid coverage for their children and drop 
the child’s private health insurance coverage. Cutler and Gruber (1996) 
emphasize that public insurance could “crowd out” private insurance in 
this way. Alternatively, they point out that employers might stop offering 
private insurance of employees’ dependents if substantial numbers of them 
were to become covered under public programs. Immigrant parents may 
be more likely than nonimmigrants to work for small, low-wage employers 
who offer insurance at less favorable rates than large employers, or who 
do not offer it at all. 
This situation is illustrated in figure 7.2, in which immigrant parents are 
assumed to face a flatter trade-off between health insurance for their chil- 
dren and other child goods than other parents. Given these opportunities, 
immigrant parents will consume less child health insurance than nonimmi- 
grant parents in the absence of Medicaid eligibility (compare point A to 
point B). Now consider what happens when the child becomes Medicaid 
eligible, assuming that the transactions costs associated with becoming 
covered are similar to those described in figure 7.1. Native-born parents 
with the preferences shown in figure 7.2 do not change their insurance 
arrangements; the private insurance they are purchasing is far superior to 
what is available under Medicaid. Immigrant parents, on the other hand, 
are made better off by moving to M2 (eligible but not covered). Although 
the health insurance offered at M2 is inferior to what was being purchased Children of Immigrants and Public Health Insurance  277 




Fig. 7.2  The role of differential opportunities 
previously, the cost savings allow a more than offsetting increase in the 
consumption of other child goods. In the data, a movement from A to M2 
will appear as an increase in the fraction of children who are uninsured. 
These diagrams implicitly assume that being eligible for Medicaid cov- 
erage of  acute services is better than not being insured  at all (i.e., that 
point M2 is higher than point N). Since some emergency care is likely to 
be available to all children in  the United States, one may question this 
assumption. However, there is considerable evidence that  suggests that 
hospitals are able to determine relatively quickly whether someone is likely 
to be Medicaid eligible. For example, Piper, Ray, and Griffin (1  990) found 
that a 1985 expansion of Medicaid eligibility to married pregnant women 
in Tennessee increased Medicaid enrollments, but that most of this in- 
crease is likely to have occurred at the time of the delivery. And it is well 
known that insured patients receive more intensive treatment than unin- 
sured patients along a  number  of  margins  (cf.  Hadley, Steinberg, and 
Feder 1991; Wenneker, Weissman, and Epstein 1990; and Currie and Gru- 
ber  1997). Hence, it seems likely that patients who are eligible for Medi- 
caid will  receive better care (and receive it with greater certainty) than 
those who are not, even if the latter do receive some acute care. 
In  summary, these  diagrams suggest that  if  immigrant parents face 
differences in transactions costs and/or opportunities relative to native- 
born parents, then they will make different choices about health insurance. 
Among parents who  were  not  purchasing private health  insurance for 
their children previously, increases in Medicaid eligibility will be associ- 
ated with larger increases in formal coverage among children of the native 
born than among children of immigrants. And among parents who were 278  Janet Currie 
purchasing private health insurance to begin with, increases in eligibility 
for Medicaid will be more likely to cause “crowding out” among immi- 
grants than among nonimmigrants.’ 
It is more difficult to make predictions about the relationship between 
utilization and eligibility among immigrants and nonimmigrants. If  eligi- 
ble children of immigrants are less likely to be formally covered than chil- 
dren of nonimmigrants, then utilization of nonacute services is less likely 
to be paid for by  Medicaid.  On the other hand, if  the main  difference 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants is that the former are less likely 
to be continuously covered, we might see little difference in the utilization 
of routine care because immigrants may simply bunch care during periods 
when they are covered. In the case of hospitalizations, eligibility is argua- 
bly a more important determinant  than coverage given that  a hospital 
that treats an eligible but uncovered child can receive reimbursement from 
Medicaid ex post. 
Although the preceding discussion assumes that immigrant and native- 
born parents have similar preferences, it is possible that there are system- 
atic cultural differences in attitudes toward the utilization of medical care. 
For example, eligible immigrant parents might be less likely to enroll in 
Medicaid because they value the available services less than native-born 
parents. It is also possible that immigrant parents have less information 
about these programs; Currie and Gruber (1996b) conclude that lack of 
information about welfare programs among the working poor may be an 
important barrier to take-up of coverage. However, as we  shall see, such 
cultural or informational explanations are not particularly consistent with 
the findings of this study: Children of immigrant parents actually show 
larger changes in the utilization of basic medical care when they become 
Medicaid eligible than do children of the native born. 
7.2  Methods 
The main  empirical  problem  involved  in  investigating  the effects of 
Medicaid eligibility on coverage and utilization is that those children who 
are most likely to be eligible are least likely to take up coverage or to use 
services, given health status. They are also more likely to be ill. Currie and 
Gruber (1996b) describe the construction of a detailed simulation model 
that uses information about state rules, the child’s age, and family charac- 
3. Both diagrams illustrate the fact that even if the child is not formally covered, the family 
may be made better off  when the child becomes Medicaid eligible. Since the utilization of 
medical care given health status is known to be a normal good, one would expect some of 
this increase in household “income” to translate into an increase in the number of visits. 
However, it is difficult to  judge how large this income effect should be, given measurement 
error in income and the fact that we do not know the value of Medicaid eligibility to the 
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teristics to impute individual Medicaid eligibilit~.~  They estimate that be- 
tween  1989 and 1992, the fraction of children less than 15 years of  age 
who were eligible for Medicaid increased from 20.4 to 3 1.2 percent, and 
that  all but  2.1 percentage  points of this increase can be attributed  to 
changes in state Medicaid rules as opposed to changes in economic condi- 
tions or demographics. 
In what follows, the Currie-Gruber imputation program is used to deter- 
mine individual eligibility. This measure is included in linear probability 
models of health insurance coverage and the utilization of medical care 
below. However, these ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are subject 
to two sources of bias. The first is omitted variables bias. In addition to 
eligibility, all of the models include observable variables associated with 
Medicaid eligibility, such as the absence of a male household head, income, 
the number of children in the family, and the age of the child (through single 
year of age dummies). Also controlled for are family income; the child’s 
gender, race, and ethnicity; whether he or she is the oldest child; the number 
of siblings; the education of the mother and (if present) the father; whether 
the mother or father was the respondent; the presence of other adult rela- 
tives; and whether the family lives in a central city or rural area. 
Even after conditioning on this detailed set of controls, however, per- 
sons who are eligible for Medicaid may have other characteristics  that 
make them less likely to take up Medicaid coverage or to utilize medical 
care. For example, they may be more likely to live in areas with limited 
access to physicians (cf. Fossett et al. 1992; Fossett and Peterson 1989). In 
this case, OLS estimates of the effects of eligibility on coverage and utiliza- 
tion would be biased toward zero. If these omitted factors are more impor- 
tant for immigrants  than for nonimmigrants, then estimates  for immi- 
grants may be more severely affected by  these biases than estimates for 
nonimmigrants. 
The second problem is that there may be substantial measurement error 
in the eligibility indicator, given limitations of the National Health Inter- 
view Survey (NHIS) income data that are discussed below. Such measure- 
ment error would normally  be  expected to bias the estimated effect of 
eligibility toward zero. Since Medicaid coverage is also self-reported (with 
some verification of the holding of Medicaid cards by interviewers), it may 
also be measured with error. An additional measurement problem is that 
children of immigrants who are themselves undocumented are ineligible 
4.  They use data from the National Health Interview Survey and the Current Population 
Survey. In these data sets, it is necessary to impute eligibility at the time of the survey on the 
basis of annual income. Devine and Heckman (1994) conduct a comparison of eligibility 
simulations using the CPS to some constructed using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), which has monthly income data. They conclude that CPS-based simu- 
lations of eligibility for  training programs produce estimates remarkably similar to those 
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for Medicaid coverage of nonemergency services, and it is not possible to 
identify these ~hildren.~ 
Hence, in addition to the OLS estimates, instrumental variables (IV) 
estimates are presented below. The aim of the instrumental variables pro- 
cedure is to abstract from characteristics of the child and/or family that 
may be correlated with eligibility, survey response error, and the depen- 
dent variables, and to achieve identification using only legislative variation 
in Medicaid policy. One way to do this would be to instrument imputed 
individual eligibility in the NHIS using the fraction of children in the same 
state, year, and age who are eligible, calculated using the Current Popula- 
tion Survey (CPS). This instrument would capture differences in Medicaid 
eligibility across states, years, and age groups, and would purge the regres- 
sion of individual-level sources of variation in eligibility. 
This approach would run into two problems in practice, however. First, 
the CPS is simply not large enough to permit reliable estimation of  the 
fraction of children eligible in each state, year, and age category. Second, 
these estimates could be biased by the omission of characteristics of state, 
year, and age groups that are correlated both with the fraction eligible and 
with utilization or health. For example, if infants in a given state and year 
were particularly poor, they might have both higher eligibility levels and 
fewer doctor’s visits, resulting in  a downward  bias in estimates  of  the 
effects of eligibility on utilization. 
In order to address these problems, an instrument that varies only with 
the legislative environment,  and not with its economic or demographic 
conditions, was developed. This instrument was constructed by first select- 
ing a national random sample of 300 children for each single year of age 
(0 to 14) from the CPS, in each year, and then using the Currie-Gruber 
program to calculate the fraction of this national sample of children who 
would have been eligible for Medicaid in each state and year,6  This mea- 
sure can be thought of as a convenient summary of the legislation affecting 
the Medicaid eligibility of  children in each state, year, and age group. In 
what follows, we  use linear probability models for ease of computation 
and for consistency of this instrumental variables procedure  (Heckman 
and MaCurdy 1985). 
5. It is difficult  to estimate the fraction of children of immigrants who are themselves 
undocumented. Estimates based  on the 1990 census suggest that 3 in 20 immigrants are 
undocumented (Banister 1994). However, many undocumented adult immigrants have citi- 
zen children who are entitled to services under the Medicaid program. It is also unclear that 
the undocumented are accurately counted in a survey such as the NHIS. 
6.  That is, how many of the 300 one-year-olds would be eligible if they all lived in Califor- 
nia, how many would be eligible if they all lived in Massachusetts, and so forth. The sample 
size of 300 was chosen due to data and computational constraints. In order to assess the 
severity of potential problems due to sampling variability, the instrument was constructed 
twice,  using two different random samples. The correlation between the two instruments 
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In principle, this instrumental variables strategy overcomes the econo- 
metric difficulties noted above-the  model is purged of endogeneity bias 
and of biases due to individual-level omitted variables that are correlated 
with both eligibility and outcomes. To the extent that the measurement 
error in the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the 
individual eligibility measure, this procedure also surmounts the measure- 
ment error pr~blem.~  Finally, using a national random sample eliminates 
the effects of state- and year-specific economic conditions that might be 
correlated with both eligibility and with utilization; the problem of small 
age/year/state cell sizes is also eliminated. This instrument is strongly cor- 
related with individual eligibility, among both natives and immigrants- 
the t-statistic is over 10 in the first-stage equations. 
Of course, using legislation as the source of identifying variation raises 
the question of whether laws can be treated as exogenous variables. It is 
possible, for example, that states raise eligibility for Medicaid in response 
to poor outcomes among children. It is important to note that much of 
the identifying variation used in this paper is a result of federal mandates 
and is therefore outside the control of state governments. States differed 
widely in their propensity to take up optional Medicaid expansions prior 
to 1989. Hence, states started with differing levels of generosity, a fact that 
can  be controlled  for  by  including  state fixed  effects in  the empirical 
model. Between 1989 and 1992, however, even the most recalcitrant states 
were forced to extend Medicaid coverage to meet federal standards, with 
the result  that  greater  uniformity  across states was achieved. Thus,  al- 
though New Hampshire and Minnesota ended up with similar programs 
in 1992, New Hampshire expanded eligibility much more rapidly over this 
period as federal mandates began to bite. Note that possible legislative 
endogeneity would be a potentially far greater problem if, instead of simu- 
lating the fraction eligible for Medicaid, various state rules that help to 
determine eligibility, such as maximum AFDC benefit levels, had been 
used. The problem is that benefit levels in other programs may be corre- 
lated with other characteristics of states that affect the utilization of health 
care and insurance coverage. 
The models estimated in this paper all take the following form: 
OUTCOME = Po + P,ELIG + P,PARlMMIG + &PARELIG 
(1)  + p,X  + @,STATE + &YEAR + P,CHILDAGE 
+ &AGEYEAR + &STATEAGE + E, 
7. If the measurement error stems mainly from random individual response error, then 
measurement error in the CPS instrument will be uncorrelated with that in the NHIS data, 
especially given the fact that the measure calculated using the CPS is the average eligibility 
for a large group. 282  Janet Currie 
where OUTCOME is  an indicator for either insurance status or utiliza- 
tion, ELIG is an indicator equal to one if the child is eligible for Medicaid, 
PARIMMIG is an indicator equal to one if at least one parent is an immi- 
grant, PARELIG is an interaction term equal to one if the child is eligible 
and a parent is an immigrant, and Xis a vector of additional explanatory 
variables. In addition, the models all include state fixed effects and a full 
set of dummy variables for calendar years and for each child’s single year 
of age. These variables control for variables such as secular trends in utili- 
zation rates or changes in the recommended schedule of visits for various 
age groups. Interactions between five broad age groups and the year dum- 
mies, and between the five age groups and the state of residence are also in- 
cluded.8 
In this framework, we  can test for whether eligible immigrants behave 
similarly to eligible natives by  looking at whether p, + p,  + p, = 0,. In 
principal,  it would  be  possible  to estimate a fully interacted  model  in 
which all of the coefficients were allowed to vary with immigrant status. 
In practice, it was found that this had little effect on the inferences that 
could be drawn from OLS estimates of the effects of eligibility. However, 
the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates were much less precisely esti- 
mated in the fully interacted model, which may reflect the difficulties in- 
volved in trying to draw many inferences about differences between immi- 
grants and natives from a relatively small sample of immigrants. 
7.3  Data 
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) interviews a large, na- 
tionally representative cross section of American families each year.9  The 
baseline  survey collects information  about demographic characteristics 
and family income. There are also a number of questions about the utiliza- 
tion  of medical care over the previous year. These data cover approxi- 
mately 100,000 individuals and 30,000 children less than age 15 in each 
year. This age cutoff was chosen in order to avoid issues arising from the 
fact that teens may become eligible for Medicaid due to pregnancy. 
Beginning in  1989, the NHIS has asked all non-native-born adults in 
the household how long they have lived in the United States. Using this 
information, it is possible to determine whether either the mother or father 
8. The five groups are: less than 1 ; greater than or equal to 2 and less than or equal to 4; 
greater than or equal to 5 and less than or equal to 7; greater than or equal to 8 and less 
than or equal to 10; and greater than or equal to 11. All of the children in the sample are 14 
or under. 
9. The models estimated in this paper are unweighted but include controls for key variables 
used in stratifying the sample such as race, central city residence, and rural residence. The 
inclusion of these variables results in estimates similar to those that would be obtained by 
weighting (Dumouchel and Duncan 1983). Children of Immigrants and Public Health Insurance  283 
of the child is an immigrant.I0 The relatively few respondents who answer 
that they don’t know how long they have been in the United States are 
also treated as immigrants. Sixteen percent of the sample children have at 
least one parent who is an immigrant. 
The  NHIS  fields  supplements  that  ask  additional  questions  about 
health  insurance status every three years. Insurance  supplements were 
fielded in 1989 and 1992, years that neatly bracket much of the increase in 
Medicaid eligibility for low-income children. Using these supplements, it 
is possible to determine whether the child was covered by private insurance 
or Medicaid or was uninsured at the time of the interview.“ 
Information from the main NHIS survey can be used to impute Medic- 
aid eligibility to each child, although there are several problems to be over- 
come. First, family income is missing for a  number  of households,  as 
shown in table 7C.2. Missing income data are imputed by using CPS data 
to estimate regressions of income on household characteristics, and then 
using the regression coefficients to calculate income for NHIS households 
with similar characteristics. The census Bureau uses a similar procedure 
to impute missing data in the CPS. These estimates were calculated sepa- 
rately for each year.’* 
Second, when family income is reported, it is reported in brackets. This 
is less of a problem than it might first appear because it causes problems 
10. In principal, one could distinguish between the effects of having an immigrant father 
and the effects of having an immigrant mother. However, 83 percent of children who had at 
least one immigrant parent had a mother who was an immigrant, while 70 percent of these 
children had an immigrant father. Thus, there is a high degree of correlation between the 
two measures, and it proved impossible to separate these effects. 
11. The questions about private health insurance coverage and no insurance coverage are 
straightforward. The 1989 insurance supplement asks four questions about public health 
insurance coverage. Parents are asked whether each child received Medicaid in the past  12 
months, has a Medicaid card, is covered by  some other type of public assistance program 
that pays for health care, or is covered by  any type of public assistance health insurance 
coverage. In 1989, for example, 7,287 respondents reported receiving Medicaid in the past 
12 months; 7,319 said they had a Medicaid card (and this was verified for 4,534 individuals); 
8,072 said that they were covered by  public assistance health insurance coverage; and 686 
said that  they were covered by  some form of  public assistance health insurance coverage 
other than Medicaid. Hence, the most inclusive definition of Medicaid coverage, which is 
the one adopted here, is to count as Medicaid covered anyone who received public assistance 
health insurance that was not of some “other” type. This leaves 7,386 individuals, which is 
not very different than what would be obtained using the least inclusive measure-the  7,287 
individuals who reported “receiving” Medicaid in 1989. Experimentation with other possible 
measures of Medicaid coverage produced results similar to those reported below. The 1992 
supplement simply asks about Medicaid coverage. The existence of “other” public health 
insurance programs accounts for the fact that the effects of eligibility on Medicaid coverage, 
private health insurance coverage, and no insurance coverage may not sum to zero. 
12. For most of the missing observations, we  know whether income was greater than or 
less than $20,000, so I can impute income within those subsamples. The imputation regres- 
sions fit fairly well; the R2s for the yearly regressions estimated using all individuals average 
0.45. For those with incomes below $20,000, the R2s average 0.32; while for those with in- 
comes above $20,000, the R2s average 0.25. 284  Janet Currie 
only when the Medicaid cutoff falls in the middle of the family’s reported 
income bracket, and the income brackets are in $1,000 increments if in- 
come is less than $20,000.13  Two approaches to this problem were tried. 
The first involved predicting income within the bracket using regressions 
estimated using the CPS, as described above. The second method involved 
choosing a random number within the bracket. Since the estimated frac- 
tion eligible was very similar under both approaches, the simpler method 
was used. The estimated models control for income brackets rather than 
the noisy imputed income measure, and interactions between the (nomi- 
nal) income brackets and the year dummies are included in order to ac- 
count for inflation. The omitted income category in all the models esti- 
mated below is “missing.” 
A third problem is that there is no information about the distribution 
of income across family members, or about income sources. This lack of 
information is potentially problematic because, for example, some portion 
of earnings, but not other types of income, can be disregarded from total 
family income in determining AFDC eligibility, which in turn affects Med- 
icaid eligibility. In this paper, these disregards are applied to total income, 
under the assumption that most family income comes from earnings, espe- 
cially in poor families.I4 These limitations of the NHIS income data do 
not seem to lead to any systematic measurement problems; the resulting 
annual eligibility rate in the NHIS is similar to that calculated using the 
CPS in terms of both levels and the time-series trend.I5 
This paper focuses on three measures of the utilization of medical ser- 
vices over the past year: whether or not the child had a doctor’s visit in 
the past year; the number of doctor’s visits if  the child had any visits; 
and whether or not the child was hospitalized in the past year.16 Since the 
utilization measures are available in every year, the data set available for 
examining utilization is approximately twice as large as that available for 
examining insurance coverage. 
Pediatric guidelines recommend at least one doctor’s visit per year for 
all of the children in the sample, so that the absence of a doctor’s visit in 
the previous year is suggestive of an access problem, regardless of underly- 
ing morbidity. If the marginal benefit of doctor’s visits is decreasing in the 
number of visits (which seems reasonable if  children who get any visits 
13. For incomes over $20,000 and less than $50,000 the brackets  are in  increments  of 
$5,000. The last bracket is for incomes over $50,000. 
14. In the  1984 CPS, 75 percent of the average child’s family income comes from his or 
her parents’ earnings. 
15. In the years  1989 to 1992, the percentages of children eligible for Medicaid in the 
NHIS data were 19.3,25.2,27.5, and 31.5 percent, respectively. These numbers are very close 
to those calculated from the CPS. 
16. Although the NHIS asks many other questions about utilization, most pertain to a 
two-week window. Even in a sample as large as the NHIS, this sampling scheme yields very 
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receive some necessary preventive care), then this first visit is also the most 
important from the point of view of the child’s health. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to examine the number  of doctor’s visits conditional on the 
child receiving care, since the cost of care will be increasing in the number 
of visits. Because this distribution is highly skewed to the right, the analy- 
sis focuses on the log of the number of doctor’s visits. 
We examine hospitalizations primarily because they are so much more 
expensive than doctor’s visits and, hence, account for a disproportionate 
share of Medicaid costs. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives 
(1993) reports that in 1991, the Medicaid program spent $5.4 billion on 
inpatient hospital services for AFDC children, and only $1.5 billion on 
physician services.I7  However, approximately 80 percent of children re- 
ceive a doctor’s visit in any given year, while only 3-5  percent of children are 
hospitalized. Hence, inferences about differences in hospitalization  rates 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants are based on small sample sizes. 
An overview of the data on eligibility, coverage, and utilization is shown 
in table 7.2. All means are calculated using sample weights.l*  The first row 
of table 7.2 indicates that 35 percent of immigrant children are Medicaid 
eligible, compared to 21 percent of the children of the native born. This 
evidence is consistent with previous work that shows that immigrants are 
more likely than natives to be eligible for social programs. The second row 
of table 7.2 suggests that although a slightly higher fraction of immigrant 
children are currently covered by  Medicaid (18 percent compared to 14 
percent of children of  the native born), average take-up rates conditional 
on eligibility are actually lower among immigrants: Approximately 50 per- 
cent of the Medicaid-eligible immigrant children are covered compared to 
66 percent of eligible children of the native born. Immigrant children are 
also less likely to be covered by private health insurance, with the result 
that 25 percent of the immigrant children are without health insurance 
coverage compared to 12 percent of other children. 
This large difference in the probability of having health insurance cover- 
age is associated with relatively small differences in the utilization of care, 
however. The second panel of table 7.2 indicates that 19 percent of immi- 
grant children went without a visit in the 12 months prior to the survey, 
whether or not they were Medicaid eligible. The comparable figures for 
17. Some of these physician services would have been rendered in hospitals. 
18. An earlier version of this paper broke out children with at least one parent who immi- 
grated less than 10 years ago. In principle, a comparison of these “new” immigrants with all 
immigrants is of interest because of evidence that new immigrants are less skilled than previ- 
ous cohorts (Borjas 1990) and because new arrivals may be less familiar with Medicaid and 
may face higher transactions costs of enrolling in the program. However, even in a sample 
as large as the NHIS, there are relatively few children of new immigrants, making it difficult 
to judge the effects of  assimilation. Leclere, Jensen, and Biddlecom (1994) find that among 
adults, recent immigrants are less likely than either the native born or immigrants of longer 
duration to receive timely health care. Table 7.2  Eligibility. Coverage, and Utilization in the NHIS 
Jnsurance Status 
~~  ~~~ 
All Natives  All Immigrants 
Number of observations  49,979  8,934 
Medicaid eligible  .21  .35 
Medicaid coverage  .14  .18 
Private health insurance  .72  .56 
No insurance  .I2  .25 
Fraction eligible in child’s statelagelyear  .25  .28 
Utilization of Medical Care 
All Natives  All Immigrants 
Medicaid  Not Medicaid  Medicaid  Not Medicaid 
Eligible  Eligible  Eligible  Eligible 
Number of observations  25,577  81,374  7,852  12,394 
Number of doctor’s 
No visit in past year  .I5  .I6  .I9  .19 
visits last year if any  5.83  5.24  4.50  4.12 
visits  (.083)  (.047)  (.127)  (.067) 
Hospitalized in past year  .07  .04  .04  .03 
Utilization of Medical Care by  Income and Insurance Status 
All Natives  All Immigrants 
Income  Income  Income  Income  Income  Income 




No  visit in past year 
Number of doctor’s 
visits last year if 
any visits 





No visit in past year 
Number of doctor’s 
visits last year if 
any visits 





















153  1,654 
.08  .12 
5.74  5.51 
(.53)  (.34) 
.I0  .06 
14,203  1,271 
.I1  .I8 
5.47  4.00 
(.11)  (.26) 





















Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Means calculated using annual weights. Means for insurance status 
are calculated using data from 1989 to 1992 only, whereas means for utilization are calculated using 1989, 
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children of the native born are 15 percent for Medicaid eligibles and 16 
percent for noneligibles, indicating that the differences between natives 
and immigrants are much greater than the differences between the insured 
and uninsured. Conditional on having had at least one visit, Medicaid- 
eligible children had slightly more visits. But the difference of 0.4 or 0.6 
more visits is much smaller than the raw differences between children of 
the native born and children of immigrants, which are on the order of 1.1 
to 1.3 visits. The largest difference between those who are Medicaid eligi- 
ble and those who are not is in terms of hospitalizations-native  children 
on Medicaid are almost twice as likely to be hospitalized as those who are 
not covered. 
The third panel of table 7.2 shows differences in utilization by insurance 
status and income. These figures lend support to the view that the private 
insurance policies held by many low-income households may be less desir- 
able than Medicaid. For example, among natives, 13 percent of Medicaid 
households with incomes less than $20,000 (the vast majority of Medicaid 
households) went without a doctor’s visit in the past year. The comparable 
figure for privately insured households is 19 percent. It is only in privately 
insured households with incomes over $40,000 per year that the incidence 
of going without doctor’s visits falls below the Medicaid rate. A similar 
pattern is evident in immigrant households. Within income brackets, chil- 
dren on Medicaid tend to receive more doctor visits conditional on any 
visits than the privately insured. And among the privately insured, number 
of doctor visits increases with income, which may be (at least in part) a 
reflection of the generosity of the insurance coverage. 
What remains to be seen is how much of these raw differences can be 
explained by the characteristics of immigrant children and their families. 
Some additional characteristics of children of immigrants and children of 
the native born and their families are shown in table 7C.2. As others have 
noted, immigrant parents are less skilled on average than other parents. 
Immigrant families also are poorer, have more children, are more likely to 
have other adults present in addition to the parents, are less likely to be 
female headed, and are more likely to live in central cities than other fami- 
lies. These differences will be controlled for in the models estimated below. 
Thus, these models focus on the differences between immigrants and simi- 
lar natives, rather than on the differences between immigrants and all na- 
tives. 
7.4  Results 
7.4.1  Effects of Eligibility on Insurance Coverage 
This section investigates the relationship between Medicaid eligibility 
and type of insurance coverage among children of immigrants and chil- 288  Janet Currie 
dren of the native born. Ordinary least squares models of the probability 
of Medicaid coverage are shown in the first three columns of table 7.3. 
Table 7.1 indicated that immigrants were more likely to be  eligible for 
Medicaid, but had lower take-up rates conditional on eligibility. Control- 
ling for observable characteristics does not change this finding. The first 
row of table 7.3 indicates that becoming eligible for Medicaid increases 
the probability of coverage among children of the native born by  21 per- 
centage points. The effect of eligibility is somewhat smaller among immi- 
grants, as indicated by the negative interaction between eligibility and an 
indicator equal to one if the parent is an immigrant. The coefficient on the 
“parent immigrant” indicator is also significantly negative, indicating that 
children of immigrant parents are less likely to be enrolled in Medicaid 
conditional on observable characteristics. An F-test soundly rejected the 
null hypothesis that the combined effect of the parent immigrant indicator 
and the interaction was zero; hence, we conclude that eligible immigrants 
are significantly less likely than similar eligible natives to take up Medicaid 
coverage. The point estimates suggest that becoming eligible increases the 
probability of coverage by  18 percentage points among children of immi- 
grants rather than 21 percentage points.19 
The OLS estimates for private insurance coverage and the probability 
of noninsurance suggest that among natives, most of the increase in Med- 
icaid coverage that accompanies eligibility increases comes at the expense 
of private health insurance coverage, while among immigrants, some fami- 
lies are dropping or losing private health insurance and becoming unin- 
sured. 
There  is  some evidence  in  table  7.3  that  the  transactions  costs  of 
applying for Medicaid matter, since children in larger families are more 
likely to be covered than other children (transactions costs imply that there 
are economies of scale involved in applying for Medicaid). Also, children 
in central cities where it may be easier to apply are more likely to be cov- 
ered. Finally, there appears to be a strong seasonal effect: Medicaid cover- 
age falls in winter and spring relative to summer and fall. This pattern 
suggests that many parents sign children up for Medicaid in summer and 
fall in order to get routine care such as immunizations that schools man- 
date. Then, six months later when children must be recertified (in most 
states), the parents do not renew the child’s coverage. 
The remaining rows of table 7.3 show that, for the most part, coverage 
19. I have also estimated models that exclude parent’s education, income, and measures 
of family structure. These models ask whether take-up is similar among immigrants and all 
natives, rather than focusing on similar natives. The pattern found is qualitatively similar to 
that reported in table 7.3, although the estimated effects of  eligibility  are larger for both 
natives and immigrants. For example, eligibility  is estimated to increase the probability of 
Medicaid coverage by  32 percentage points among natives, but by only 22 percentage points 
among children of immigrants. Table 7.3  Effects of Eligibility on Insurance Coverage 
OLS  TSLS 
Medicaid  Private  No Insurance  Medicaid  Private  No Insurance 
(1 1  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Medicaid 






Mother high school dropout 
Mother some college 
Male head high school dropout 
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-.057 Table 7.3  (continued) 
OLS  TSLS 
Medicaid  Private  No Insurance  Medicaid  Private  No Insurance 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Child is eldest 
Number of siblings 
No  male head 
Mother is respondent 
Male head is respondent 
Other adult female relatives 
in household 
Other adult male relatives 
in household 
Income <$10,000 
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varies with child and family characteristics as one might expect. For ex- 
ample, children of richer parents are less likely to be covered, while chil- 
dren of less-educated parents are more likely to be covered. One notewor- 
thy finding is that the probability of coverage is much higher in families 
without a male head. This differential may reflect the fact that families on 
AFDC are already familiar with the welfare system and, in most cases, 
are already covered by Medicaid. Finally, although they are not shown, 
the age dummies included in the regression indicate that younger children 
are more likely to have coverage, other  things  being equal. This result 
may reflect a higher perceived benefit of regular medical care for younger 
children, or more illnesses requiring care. 
As discussed above, it is possible  that OLS estimates of the effects of 
becoming eligible under the Medicaid expansions reflect omitted variables 
that  are correlated  with both eligibility and coverage. Suppose, for ex- 
ample, that some children are both more likely to be eligible and more 
likely to have been covered by  Medicaid in the absence of the Medicaid 
expansions, perhaps because they receive AFDC benefits or because their 
parents are refugees. In this case, the estimated effect of making someone 
eligible for Medicaid under the expansions would be biased upward. Simi- 
larly, it is easy to see that OLS estimates of the effect of eligibility on private 
health insurance coverage are likely to be biased downward, while those on 
being uninsured are likely to be biased upward; that is, the same children 
who are most likely to be made eligible for Medicaid arc least likely to have 
private health insurance coverage and most likely to be uninsured. 
The remaining three columns of table 7.3 show TSLS estimates of the 
effects of eligibility on insurance coverage. The estimated effects of eligibil- 
ity on Medicaid coverage are remarkably robust. Once again, it appears 
that eligibility raises the probability  of Medicaid coverage more among 
natives  than among immigrants (18 percentage  points compared to 14 
percentage points), and the point estimates are similar to those obtained 
via OLS. However, instrumenting has a large effect on the estimated effects 
of eligibility on private health insurance and the probability of being unin- 
sured. While the OLS estimates suggested substantial crowding out of pri- 
vate insurance, the TSLS estimates indicate that most of the gain in Med- 
icaid coverage is in fact coming from the uninsured population. 
Are these TSLS estimates reasonable? Note first that although the stan- 
dard errors are large, the changes in the point estimates are also large. 
Thus, it is not the case that the effect of eligibility on private  insurance 
becomes statistically insignificant in the TSLS specification solely because 
of the increase in the size of the standard errors. Still, it is possible that 
trends in the private health insurance market (e.g., concerns about increas- 
ing numbers of uninsured among the “working poor”) drove some of the 
expansions of Medicaid eligibility, which would call these TSLS estimates 
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One crude specification check involves excluding variables such as par- 
ent’s education and income from the TSLS models. If these characteristics 
are uncorrelated with the fraction eligible in the state, then the instrumen- 
tal variables strategy remains valid, and one should obtain the same TSLS 
estimates of the effects of Medicaid eligibility whether or not these vari- 
ables are included. In fact, the results for Medicaid coverage are qualita- 
tively similar (e.g., larger effects on Medicaid coverage among natives than 
among immigrants), but all of the estimated effects of Medicaid eligibility 
are larger in absolute value, and the effect of Medicaid eligibility on pri- 
vate health insurance coverage has the wrong sign. Thus, there is some 
evidence that individual characteristics that affect insurance coverage are 
correlated with the fraction eligible instrument. If these characteristics are 
not adequately controlled for in the specifications shown in table 7.3, then 
the instrument may be invalid. 
In any case, the estimated effect of eligibility on Medicaid may seem 
low compared to take-up rates of approximately two-thirds for programs 
such as AFDC or food stamps. One reason for low take-up rates may be 
that many of the newly eligible were already covered by  private health 
insurance. A second consideration is that many of the newly eligible were 
unfamiliar with welfare programs in general and unaware that it was now 
possible for them to qualify for Medicaid without being on welfare. Third, 
given transactions costs, many eligibles may not enroll until they have an 
urgent need for health care, leading them to cycle on and off  the rolls. 
Short, Cantor, and Monheit (1988) found that only 43 percent of Medic- 
aid patients stayed on the program for a continuous 32-month period and 
that over half of those leaving the program remained uninsured. Cycling 
will cause the fraction covered to be smaller than the fraction eligible in a 
cross section. 
It is important to keep in mind that these effects are identified using 
recent changes in Medicaid eligibility, so they should be interpreted as the 
effect that  similar changes  or reductions in  Medicaid  eligibility would 
have. Evidently, barring all immigrants from receiving Medicaid would 
have some effect on coverage rates, since some immigrants are in fact cov- 
ered. as shown in table 7.2. 
7.4.2  Effects on Utilization 
The discussion of figures 7.1 and 7.2 highlighted the fact that even if 
children do not take up Medicaid coverage, becoming eligible for Medic- 
aid is likely to make their families better off, and may therefore have some 
effect on the consumption of medical care. Alternatively, if we think about 
the problem from a dynamic point of view, it is clear that eligibility may 
be more tightly linked to utilization in the past year than Medicaid cover- 
age if children cycle in and out of coverage as needed. This section investi- 
gates the effects of eligibility on utilization of care. 294  Janet Currie 
The first column  of  table 7.4 shows linear  probability  models of  the 
effects of eligibility on the probability that a child went without a doctor’s 
visit in the past 12 months. As discussed above, this is the cleanest measure 
of utilization of health care available in the NHIS since children who do 
not see a doctor at all are likely to have a true access problem and to go with- 
out necessary preventive care. Becoming eligible for Medicaid is associated 
with an increase in the utilization of care. The insignificant interaction of 
immigrant  status and eligibility suggests that becoming eligible has the 
same effect on all children. However, immigrant parents are about 3 per- 
centage points less likely to have taken their child for a visit in the last 
year, and the increases in eligibility do not seem to have affected this gap. 
The second column of table 7.4 suggests that while children of immi- 
grants have fewer doctor’s visits than children of the native born, becom- 
ing eligible for Medicaid has little effect on the number of doctor’s visits 
among either group, given that they had at least one visit. 
Finally, the third column of table 7.4 indicates that while children of 
immigrants are slightly less likely to be hospitalized than other children, 
becoming  eligible for  Medicaid  increases  hospitalizations  only  among 
children  of  the native  born. This result  is difficult to interpret because 
hospitalizations are likely to reflect supply as well as demand factors. It is 
possible, for example, that immigrants tend to live near hospitals that sup- 
ply indigent care, whereas children of the native born tend to live near 
hospitals that primarily treat the insured. In this case, increases in Medic- 
aid eligibility among previously uninsured children would increase access 
to hospital care among the native born but not among immigrants. It is 
also possible that some changes in hospitalization patterns associated with 
changes in insurance coverage reflect increases in unnecessary hospitaliza- 
tions. 
The remaining columns of table 7.4 highlight the fact that many observ- 
able characteristics have different effects on utilization than they have on 
coverage. For example, black children are more likely to have Medicaid 
coverage, but they are less likely to have received any visits in the past 
year. Similarly, table 7.3 showed that children in large families were more 
likely to be covered, while table 7.4 indicates that children in smaller fam- 
ilies are more likely to have had a doctor’s visit; the latter effect may re- 
flect parental diligence with respect to scheduling the first child’s checkups 
that is relaxed for later children, or the classic Becker (1981) child quality/ 
quantity trade-off.20  And although coverage rates were highest for children 
with less-educated  and poorer  parents,  the probability  of receiving any 
doctor’s visits was also lowest for these children. These latter results are 
consistent with previous evidence that doctor’s visits are a normal good, 
20. Alternatively, larger families have lower per capita incomes and may therefore purchase 
fewer normal goods such as health care. Table 7.4  Effects of Eligibility on the Utilization of Care 
OLS  TSLS 
Ln  Number of  Ln  Number of 
No Visits  (Number of visits)  Hospitalizations  No Visits  (Number of visits)  Hospitalizations 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(.004)  (.010)  (.002)  (.025)  (.062)  (.012) 
Medicaid eligible  (.007)  (.016)  (.003)  (.021)  (.051)  (.010) 
Medicaid  -  ,022  -.013  .009  -  .077  ,082  ,041 
Parent immigrant and  -.012  .015  p.008  -  .087  .026  -  ,039 
Parent immigrant  ,027  -.115  -  ,004  ,050  -.120  ,005 
Child male  -  .003  ,030  ,008  -.003  ,030  ,008 
(.004)  (.010)  (.002)  (.007)  (.017)  (.003) 
(.002)  (.005)  (.001)  (.002)  (.005)  (.001) 
(.  004)  (.008)  (.002)  (.004)  (.009)  (.002) 
(.004)  i.010)  (.002)  (.004)  (.010)  (.002) 
Mother high school dropout  .023  -  ,008  ,004  .028  -.014  ,002 
(.003)  (.008)  (.002)  (.004)  (.009)  i.002) 
Mother some college  -  ,030  ,043  -  ,002  -.031  ,046  -.001 
(.003)  (.007)  (.001)  (.003)  (.007)  (.001) 
Male head high school dropout  ,021  ,004  -.001  ,026  p.001  ,002 
(.  004)  (.009)  (.002)  (.004)  (.010)  (.002) 
Black  ,038  -.215  -  ,005  .037  p.218  -  ,007 
Hispanic  ,005  -.023  .002  .012  -  .025  .004 
(continued) Table 7.4  (continued) 
OLS  TSLS 
Ln  Number of  Ln  Number of 
No Visits  (Number of visits)  Hospitalizations  No Visits  (Number of visits)  Hospitalizations 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Male head some college 
Child is eldest 
Number of siblings 
No male head 
Mother is respondent 
Male head is respondent 
Other adult female relatives 
in household 
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and one that more educated parents tend to value more (cf. Currie and 
Thomas 1995). 
As discussed above, these OLS estimates of the effects of eligibility are 
likely to be biased toward zero if eligible children are those who are most 
likely to go without medical care for unobservable  reasons. TSLS esti- 
mates of the effect of eligibility on utilization appear in the last three rows 
of table 7.4. Column (4) suggests that OLS estimates of the effects of Med- 
icaid eligibility on the probability of “no visits” are indeed biased toward 
zero. Moreover,  the bias appears to be greater  for immigrants  than for 
natives, since the probability of going without a visit declines by 8 percent- 
age points among eligible natives but by  11 percentage points among eli- 
gible immigrants, and this difference is statistically significant. Recall that 
eligible immigrants were less likely to take up Medicaid coverage than eli- 
gible natives, yet they are more likely to receive at least one doctor’s visit. 
The juxtaposition of these results supports the view that immigrants face 
greater transactions costs than natives and hence spend more time with- 
out formal  Medicaid coverage. On the other hand, neither  the OLS or 
TSLS results show any effect of eligibility on the number of doctor visits 
conditional on the child having had at least one visit. 
Finally, OLS estimates of the effects of eligibility on hospitalizations 
also  appear to be  biased  toward  zero,  though instrumenting  does not 
change  the  qualitative  finding that eligibility  increases  hospitalizations 
among natives but not among children of immigrants. The effect for chil- 
dren of the native born is large (implying a 100 percent increase in hospi- 
talizations) but consistent with what was shown in the means in table 7.2. 
A specification check similar to that described above was conducted for 
the models shown in table 7.4. That is, the TSLS models were reestimated 
excluding variables such as parent’s education, income, and family struc- 
ture. The resulting estimates were extremely similar to those reported in 
table 7.4. Thus, there  is little evidence that these measurable individual 
characteristics are correlated with both utilization of care and the fraction 
eligible instrument  in  a way  that  would  invalidate  the instrument.  The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the TSLS results regarding utilization 
are more robust than those regarding insurance coverage. In particular, it 
is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the extent to which public 
insurance has crowded out private insurance using these data. 
7.5  Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that children  of immigrants  are more likely 
than other children to be eligible for Medicaid. Despite higher eligibility 
levels, the fraction of children covered by Medicaid is only slightly higher 
among immigrant  children, which indicates that immigrants  have lower 
average take-up rates.  Moreover,  recent  eligibility expansions  increased 
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whether or not characteristics  such as parental education, income, and 
family structure are controlled for. 
The eligibility expansions had quite different effects on the utilization 
of care, suggesting that a narrow focus on coverage can lead to quite mis- 
leading assessments of the costs and benefits of extending eligibility. Be- 
coming eligible for Medicaid reduced the probability  that a child went 
without a doctor’s visit in the past year dramatically for both immigrants 
and nonimmigrants. On the other hand, becoming eligible was not associ- 
ated with an increase in the number of doctor’s visits given at least one 
visit among either group of children, and it was associated with greater 
increases in hospitalization rates among children of the native born but 
not among children of immigrants. 
Thus, among immigrants, the main effect of becoming eligible for Med- 
icaid was to reduce the number of children going without any doctor’s 
visits. As discussed above, in  1997 there were 12 million children with at 
least one immigrant parent. If we follow table 7.2 and assume that 35 per- 
cent of these children are eligible for Medicaid, then if Medicaid caused 
11 percent of these children to receive an additional doctor visit at a cost 
of $50 per visit, the total bill would be approximately $2.3 million dollars 
per year. 
Hence, the marginal cost of extending Medicaid eligibility to children 
of immigrants appears to have been small. These results do not imply that 
the total cost of providing Medicaid to immigrant children is insignificant; 
as discussed above, the United States has been spending on the order of 
$5.5 billion per year on Medicaid payments for children of immigrants. 
The key point is that reducing Medicaid eligibility for these children will 
not necessarily save money as long as children remain eligible for costly 
emergency care. In fact, costs could  increase if  lack of preventive care 
eventually increases the number of emergency cases. 
Appendix A 
Simulating Medicaid Eligibility 
This appendix describes the procedure for imputing the Medicaid eligibil- 
ity of individuals in the CPS and NHIS. The sources for information on 
state Medicaid options are the National Governors’ Association (various 
years) and Congressional Research Service (1988, 1993). 
Eligibility for AFDC 
In order to qualify for AFDC, the child’s family must satisfy three tests: 
(1) gross income must not exceed  1.85 times the state needs standard, 
(2) the gross income less certain  “disregards”  must  be  below the state 300  Janet Currie 
needs standard, and (3)  the gross income less the disregards, less a portion 
of their earnings, must be below the state’s payment standard. 
The disregards can be computed as follows. Beginning in October 198  1, 
the allowance  for work and child care expenses was $75 per month for 
work expenses and a maximum  of  $160 per child for child  care costs. 
These allowances were not changed until the Family Support Act of 1988, 
which raised the allowances to $90 for work expenses and $175 per child 
for child care expenses, effective 1 October 1989. In addition, a portion of 
earned income was disregarded. In 1984, women were allowed to keep $30 
plus one-third of earned income for 4 months. From  1985 onward, indi- 
viduals who would have become ineligible for AFDC (and hence for Medi- 
caid) after the 4  months were allowed to remain eligible for Medicaid for 
an additional 9 to 15 months depending on the state. We modeled this by 
assuming that for Medicaid eligibility purposes, women were allowed to 
keep the $30 and one-third of earned income for a year. The aim was to 
consistently model the maximum  amount that a person  could  have re- 
ceived while remaining eligible for Medicaid coverage under AFDC. 
One difficulty in implementing these rules in the NHIS is that the disre- 
gards apply only to earned income and one cannot distinguish between 
earned income and other income. It is therefore assumed that all house- 
hold income is earned. This assumption yielded AFDC eligibility findings 
in the NHIS that were similar to those from the CPS, where there are data 
on individual earnings by source. 
The second set of rules that must be evaluated to see if a child is eligible 
for AFDC are rules relating to family structure. Eligibility under the tradi- 
tional program requires that the child reside in a female-headed house- 
hold.  However, children  in two-parent  households  may  still have  been 
eligible under the AFDC-UP program. Eligibility for AFDC-UP is condi- 
tional on both current employment status and work history. We obtained 
data on AFDC-UP regulations  from Hilary  Hoynes. In addition,  some 
states covered families with Medicaid if  they  had an unemployed head, 
even if there was no AFDC coverage; these states are identified in National 
Governors’ Association (various years). 
Lacking longitudinal  data on work histories, it is assumed in the CPS 
that families are eligible if  the state has a program  and the spouse had 
worked less than 40  weeks in the previous year. In the NHTS it is only 
possible to determine whether or not the spouse is currently unemployed. 
Hence, the estimate of the AFDC-UP caseload is biased upward because 
it is not possible  to determine whether those who are unemployed have 
been attached to the labor force long enough to qualify for AFDC-UP. 
Still, our estimates of the size of the AFDC-UP caseload  appear to be 
reasonable,  as about  1  in  20  AFDC eligibles are estimated  to qualify 
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Eligibility under State Medically Needy Programs 
In some states, children in families with incomes too high for AFDC 
could qualify for Medicaid  under state Medically Needy programs.  In- 
come thresholds for these programs could be set no higher than 133 per- 
cent  of  the  state’s needs  standard  for  AFDC. Families could  “spend 
down” to these thresholds by subtracting their medical expenditures from 
their gross incomes (less disregards); if they did so, then Medicaid would 
pay the remainder of their medical expenses. In order to qualify, however, 
families must  have  high  medical  expenditures  for  several consecutive 
months (the “spend down period”). There is no way to determine which 
families have had such high medical spending in the CPS, and I do not do 
so in the NHIS, since eligibility would then be a direct function of utiliza- 
tion and health. As an approximation, eligibility thresholds are set to the 
Medically Needy levels in states with this program. Data on Medically 
Needy coverage and thresholds are from National Governors’ Association 
(various years). 
Eligibility for Ribicoff Children 
Ribicoff children are those who would qualify for AFDC given income 
criteria  alone, but who do not qualify for reasons of family structure. 
States may or may not choose to cover children under this optional pro- 
gram. In states that do cover them, the family structure requirements are 
ignored and screening is done only on income. Some states cover selected 
groups of children (such as only those in two-parent families, or only those 
in institutions). However, it was not possible to obtain precise information 
on the groups of children covered. Hence, a state is counted as a “Ribicoff 
state” only if it covers all categories of children, as reported by the Na- 
tional Governors’ Association. Currie and Gruber also tried calling all of 
the states to obtain information about their Ribicoff children program; 
the resulting information appeared unreliable, since almost every state 
said that they had a program, whereas secondary sources report that cov- 
erage is much more selective. Using the state self-reported coverage yielded 
similar results to those reported in the paper. 
Eligibility under the Medicaid Expansions 
See appendix B for a summary of the relevant legislation. If family in- 
come and the child’s age were less than the cutoffs, it was assumed that the 
child was eligible. One important question is whether states apply AFDC 
disregards when computing a family’s eligibility for the expansions. Dis- 
cussions with several state and federal Medicaid administrators suggested 
that such disregards were generally applied, so they were used in our eligi- 
bility calculations. Calculating eligibility without the disregards yielded a 
significantly smaller effect of the expansions, but the regression results 
were quite similar. 302  Janet Corrie 
Appendix B 
The Medicaid Expansions 
Dejicit Reconciliation Act, 1984. Effective 1 October 1984. Required states 
to extend Medicaid coverage to children born after 30 September 1983, if 
those children lived in families that were income eligible for AFDC. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986. Effective 1 April 1987. Permit- 
ted  states to extend Medicaid coverage to children in families with in- 
comes below the federal poverty level. Beginning in fiscal year 1988, states 
could increase the age cutoff by one year each year, until all children under 
age five were covered. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1987. Effective 1 July 1988. Permitted 
states to cover children under age 2,  3, 4, or 5  who were born after 30 
September 1983. Effective 1 October 1988, states could expand coverage 
to children under age 8 born after 30 September  1983. Allows states to 
extend Medicaid eligibility to infants up to one year of age in families with 
incomes up to 185 percent of the federal poverty level. States were required 
to cover children through age 5 in fiscal year 1989, and through age 6 in 
fiscal year 1990, if the families met AFDC income standards. 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 1988. Effective  1 July  1989, states 
were required to cover infants up to one year of age in families with in- 
comes less than 75 percent of  the federal poverty level. Effective 1 July 
1990, the income threshold was raised to 100 percent of the poverty level. 
Family Support Act, 1988. Effective 1 April 1990. States were required to 
continue Medicaid coverage for  12 months among families who had re- 
ceived AFDC in 3 of the previous 6 months but who had become ineligible 
because of earnings. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1989. Effective 1 April 1990. Required 
states to extend Medicaid eligibility to children up to age 6 with family 
incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty line. 
Omnibus Budget  Reconciliation Act, 1990. Effective  1 July  1991. States 
were required to cover all children under age 19 who were born after 30 
September 1983, and whose family incomes were below 100 percent of the 
federal poverty level. Appendix C 
Table 7C.1  State Medical Eligibility Thresholds for Children 
State 
January  1988  December 1989  December  1991 
























































































































































185 Table 7C.1  (continued) 
State 
January 1988  December 1989  December 1991 





























































































































































Source: Yelowitz (1995). 
Nofe:  The age limit represents the oldest that a child could be (at a given point in time) and still be eligible under the expansions. MEDICAID% represents 
the maximum income limit for an infant (the maximum for an older child is less). Children of Immigrants and Public Health Insurance  305 
Table 7C.2  Child and Family Characteristics  in the NHIS 
Natives  Immigrants 
Child age  6.86 
(.90) 
Child male  .51 
Child black  .I7 
Child Hispanic  .05 
.I8 
.I5 
Male head employed”  .92 
Female head employed  .58 
No male head  .22 
No. of siblings in household  1.26 
Mother is respondent  .30 
Male head is respondent”  .69 
Other adult female relative in household  .03 
Other adult male relative in household  .02 
Central city  .23 
Rural  .26 
$10,000 or less  .ll 
$10,001-$20,000  .I5 
$20,001-$30,000  .I6 
$30,00  I-$40,000  .I5 
$40,001-$50,000  .I2 
Greater than $50,000  .I9 
Missing  .I2 
Mother less than 12 years education 
Mother some college  .37 
Male head less than 12 years education” 
Male head some collegea  .47 
Child oldest/only child  .55 
(.23) 





























Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Means calculated using annual weights 
aThe mean is calculated conditional on there being a male head. 
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